basic education

Department:
Basic Education
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA

SENIOR CERTIFICATE EXAMINATIONS/ NATIONAL SENIOR CERTIFICATE EXAMINATIONS

HISTORY P2

MAY/JUNE 2026

ADDENDUM

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QUESTION 1: HOW DID PW BOTHA'S GOVERNMENT REACT TO THE ANTI-APARTHEID MEDIA REPORTING DURING THE 1980s?

SOURCE 1A

The extract below, titled 'HISTORY OF RESISTANCE AND THE BLACK PRESS', by Xaba, is from *The Journalist* newspaper, dated 26 September 2017. It explains how various community newspapers became a voice against oppression in South Africa in the 1980s.

Grassroots, a community newspaper, was eventually birthed (established) in 1980 after a protracted (expanded) process of brainstorming that commenced in the 1970s amongst progressive journalists in the Writers' Association of South Africa. The newspaper would operate till 1990 and was a labour of commitment to the struggle of the African National Congress (ANC) and its allies. It grew to reach approximately 20 000 readers. Eight months after *Grassroots* was established, its first organiser, Johnny Issel, was banned, but the paper continued to exist.

The paper was made up of volunteers from 60 democratic organisations such as the Western Cape Civic Association (WCCA), Cape Areas Housing Action Committee (CAHAC), women's and youth organisations, the youth under the Cape Youth Congress (CAYCO) with over 400 contributing members and survived on funds from a group of Protestant churches in the Netherlands. By 1984, the community support of *Grassroots* encouraged the formation of *Saamstaan (United We Stand)*, a community newsletter established in the small rural town of Swellendam in the Cape Province. It soon moved base to Oudtshoorn, a larger, mainly rural town, also in the Cape. From the start, it encountered constant police harassment in an area where police vigilance (awareness) was high, compared with Cape Town.


There was also another Western Cape newspaper, *South*, which was successful in providing a voice for the United Democratic Front and other progressive forces in the area, whilst making its coverage relevant to the local community. *New Nation*, in the then Transvaal, also featured prominently in the 1980s. The resistant black press was instrumental in forging (keeping) African people's voice alive during the many decades of oppression.

[Source: *The Journalist* newspaper, 26 September 2017]

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SOURCE 1B

The cartoon below, titled 'MASS FUNERAL IN SOUTH AFRICA', drawn by E Hulme, appeared in an American newspaper, *Fort Worth Star-Telegram,* in Texas on 8 September 1986. It depicts the Minister of Home Affairs, Stoffel Botha's extreme measures in banning and censoring the print media to protect PW Botha's government from criticism.



[Source: *Fort Worth Star-Telegram*, 8 September 1986]

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SOURCE 1C

The article below, titled 'Threats of Censorship and Closures Bode Ill for South African Anti-apartheid Press', by A Croft, an American journalist, appeared in the *Los Angeles Times* newspaper on 10 January 1988. It explains how the South African government dealt with the anti-apartheid media for reporting on political violence and apartheid repression.

South Africa provoked (triggered) a worldwide uproar by imposing (enforcing) tight restrictions on the media when a national state of emergency was declared in June 1986, after months of black protest violence. The curbs (controls) barred (banned) first-hand reporting of political unrest and severely restricted news about strikes, anti-apartheid boycotts and such unofficial township structures as people's courts and street committees. They were reinforced (strengthened) in August 1987, with sweeping new powers that enabled Home Affairs Minister Stoffel Botha to censor or close for up to three months any newspaper that he believed was fanning (fuelling) revolution.

Newspaper editors say that Botha's restrictions are subjective (one-sided) and that it is impossible to know when they have been broken. They say the present battery (series) of regulations already makes it difficult for newspapers to operate, with many stories cut or dropped on legal advice. Botha can act against a newspaper that he believes consistently enhances (increases) the image of outlawed black nationalist groups, promotes the breakdown of public order or foments (encourages) hatred of the security forces.

Newspapers, like *The Sowetan*, say they would fight government action in court. Black newspapers fear that government action against them could close one of the few remaining pressure valves for the vote-less black majority and lead to more frustration and violence in the townships. 'For black people, papers like ours are the only kind of avenue where they can vent (open) some of their deeply held feelings, and now it's going to be stopped,' [Aggrey] Klaaste said.

[Source: *Los Angeles Times*, 10 January 1988]

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SOURCE 1D

The extract below, titled 'Black Journalists Under Apartheid', appeared in an online Taylor and Francis article in *Index on Censorship*, Issue 7: Volume 17, 1988 on 24 October 2007. In this source Mojalefa Moseki reflects on his personal experience as a journalist during the apartheid government's media censorship period in the 1980s.

'… My arrival at *The Sowetan* coincided with the rent protests in the Vaal Townships and the uprising and the tricameral parliament elections in September 1984. The creativity and resilience (resistance) of reporters at the paper came to the fore (front) and the popular daily became a must for opinion leaders in the black townships countrywide. But the paper and reporters paid heavily; some were seriously injured, in some cases 'accidentally'; company cars and photographic equipment were confiscated.

Impromptu (Unplanned) meetings were called by the editor at *The Sowetan* as warnings against 'portraying the police in a bad light' or 'instigating (starting) unrest' piled in from the then Minister of Law and Order, Mr Louis le Grange. Nevertheless, reporting remained lively at *The Sowetan* under deputy editor A Klaaste, features editor J Thloloe and news editor T Mazwai, who had long ago lost whatever 'fear' they had of the government laws. As staffers they had seen the demise (end) of *The World* and *The Post* and had all been detained at one stage or another for alleged violations of the security laws. There is no way a black person can avoid arrest in South Africa, never mind how law abiding.

Klaaste, Thloloe and Mazwai could not conceal (hide) their anger at government warnings against the paper and the security forces' activities in black townships. But the anger was usually short-lived as it always found its way into the pages of *The Sowetan* only to be often cut out by subeditors complying with the censorship laws. But the news editor, and the subeditors too, lost their duties when lawyers started determining which stories went into the paper. This was the trend for all papers during the mid-80s, except the pro-government Afrikaans press.'

[Source: *Index on Censorship*, Issue 7: Volume 17, 1988]

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QUESTION 2: WHY WAS THE GRANTING OF AMNESTY BY THE TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION (TRC) TO THE SECURITY BRANCH POLICEMEN FOR THE DEATH OF STANZA BOPAPE CONSIDERED CONTROVERSIAL*?

SOURCE 2A

This source is an extract from the *Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) Final Report* submitted in 1998. It exposes a high-level cover-up of Stanza Bopape's death by the Security Branch and why his mother appealed for assistance from the TRC.

Mr [Johannes Stanley Maisha] 'Stanza' Bopape, a well-known activist and general secretary of the Mamelodi Civic Association, died in police custody at John Vorster Square on 12 June 1988, three days after he had been detained with his flatmate Mr Bheki Nkosi. A high-level cover-up, including a fake escape and secret disposal of Mr Bopape's body was approved by the Commissioner of Police, General Johan van der Merwe, in order to avoid the negative political ramifications (results) of his death in police custody.

Until the recent amnesty applications of a number of policemen involved in Bopape's death, a public fiction (lie) had been maintained that Bopape 'escaped' from police custody while being transported from Johannesburg to the Vaal. According to the then Minister of Law and Order, Mr Adriaan Vlok, Bopape escaped when three policemen with whom he was travelling got out of the car to change a punctured tyre. Bopape allegedly found the keys to unlock his handcuffs and fled. Police reported that they shot at him but failed to apprehend (arrest) him, and claimed that he must have left the country to join the African National Congress (ANC).

Mr Bopape's mother, Ms Mokgaetji Francina Bopape, breaking down several times, made an impassioned (emotional) plea at the Commission's (TRC) Pietersburg hearings for information about her son's whereabouts. After a fruitless (unsuccessful) search by her husband for [Stanza] Bopape in the ANC exile community, Ms Bopape became convinced that her son had died in police custody. However, she was never able to confirm this. She told the Commission that she wanted 'the police who were with him [to] come here and tell us where the bones are'.


[Source: *TRC Final Report*, Volume 3, Chapter 2, 1998]

***CONTROVERSIAL:** questionable

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SOURCE 2B

The image below is from an interview conducted with Francina Bopape, Stanza Bopape's mother, in the SABC *Special Report on Truth and Reconciliation,* Episode 83, Part 1 on 1 March 1998. It highlights her response to the testimony given by the Security Branch policemen at the TRC hearing held on 23 February 1998.



[Source: The SABC *Special Report on Truth and Reconciliation*, Episode 83, Part 1, 1 March 1998]

'All I am asking of them is to tell the truth and give me Stanza's bones.'

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SOURCE 2C

This source below is from the testimony by Major Adriaan van Niekerk (member of the Security Branch of the South African Police) at the Truth and Reconciliation Commission hearing into the death of Stanza Bopape held on 23 February 1998. It sheds light on the interrogation and subsequent death of Stanza Bopape in police custody at the hands of the Security Branch policemen and why the TRC granted amnesty to the perpetrators.

MR PRINSLOO (Commissioner): Mr Van Niekerk, would you tell the Committee what happened with regard to the interrogation of Stanza Bopape?

MR VAN NIEKERK (member of the Security Branch of the South African Police): On 12 June 1988, Mr Bopape was questioned by Mr Mostert and Mr Engelbrecht at John Vorster Square. He refused to co-operate and denied any involvement with the ANC or terrorist activities. I spoke to him personally and explained the seriousness of his detention under section 29, but he still refused to talk. Later that day we discussed the situation and decided to give him a fright (scare him) to persuade him to co-operate … We tied Mr Bopape to a strong wooden chair in the corridor outside my office. His shirt was removed, and his hands and feet were bound to the chair. Sergeant Du Preez operated the electric shock device while Mr Engelbrecht applied the electrodes (electrical wires) to Bopape's body.

During the third round, Mr Bopape's head fell forward, and I realised something was wrong. We untied him and placed him on the floor. Sergeant Du Preez attempted mouth-to-mouth resuscitation (revival), but he showed no signs of life. We felt for a pulse, but he was already dead.

All of us present – myself, Major Charles Zeelie, Warrant Officer Hendrik Mostert, Sergeant Johan du Preez and Constable Jakobus Engelbrecht – believed he had died. I immediately phoned General Erasmus and informed him of what had happened. Chairperson, it was never our intention to kill him; the aim was only to obtain information. It was common practice in the Security Branch to use such methods when detainees refused to co-operate.

… The TRC concluded … We are, in the circumstances and in the light of what is said above, satisfied that they have made a full disclosure of all the relevant facts.

As a result, their application for amnesty succeeds.

[Source: *Looking Back, Reaching Forward: Reflections on the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa* by C Villa-Vicencio and W Verwoerd]

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SOURCE 2D

The source below is an extract from an article titled 'Lid Not Lifted on Bopape Cover-up' by P Pigou, a former TRC investigator, which appeared in the *Mail and Guardian* newspaper on 28 April 2000. It suggests that the granting of amnesty to 10 former security policemen for the death of Stanza Bopape was controversial and a threat to the credibility of the amnesty process.

The Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) came to yet another controversial finding … when it granted amnesty to 10 former security policemen for their role in the murder of Mamelodi activist Stanza Bopape in June 1988.

The disappearance of Bopape will go down in history as one of apartheid South Africa's most elaborate cover-ups. Despite having vanished in 1988, Bopape's death was only confirmed after the matter came before the TRC. It is the only case before the Commission in which a full array (display) of police ranks – from constable to the then head of the security police (and South Africa's first post-apartheid police commissioner), General Johannes Velde van der Merwe – applied for amnesty.

The TRC found that the applicants were compliant with the amnesty criteria, having made full disclosure of all the relevant facts. But a closer examination of the amnesty transcripts and judgements reveals a selective use of available evidence and no attempt to make further inquiries regarding a wide range of relevant issues.

The applicants presented a well-oiled account of events that carefully interlocked and reinforced each other's versions. Some sections of the written applications used identical script and turns of phrase, leaving the impression that they could have been contrived (false) and selective in detail.

[Source: *Mail and Guardian* newspaper, 28 April 2000]

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QUESTION 3: DOES THE CHINESE BELT AND ROAD INITIATIVE (BRI) BENEFIT BRICS+ COUNTRIES?

SOURCE 3A

The extract below, from a research article titled 'BRI: Bridging or Breaking BRICS' by D Thussu, appeared in the journal *Global Media and China*, 2018, Vol. 3(2). It highlights the nature of China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and its connection to BRICS.

China's ambitious Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has the potential to transform the geo-economic landscape of Asia, the Middle East, Africa and even Europe. Conceived (Created) in 2013 and outlined in 2015 by China's National Development and Reform Committee, it was formally launched in May 2017. Due for completion in the next decade, the BRI comprises more than 900 infrastructure projects – ranging from ports and roads to digital infrastructure, valued at about US$1,3 trillion.

The BRI projects are to be backed by a US$40 billion Silk Road Infrastructure Fund, and will also be supported by the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank together with the Shanghai-based BRICS bank, or to give its formal name, the New Development Bank (NDB), established in 2014 by the five BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) nations.

In most Chinese official and journalistic accounts, the BRI has been projected as 'a win-win situation' for all concerned. However, some see this significant geo-political endeavour (effort) as designed to promote Chinese political and economic interests in strategically important areas in Asia and beyond, presenting an alternative to the US-dominated security and economic infrastructure that has shaped the world since the Second World War.

For many developing countries that are involved in the BRI projects, it opens up huge potential for rapid access to modern amenities and infrastructure and to benefit from Chinese largess (wealth). Among the BRICS nations the attitude is more complex. Two of China's main BRICS partners – Russia and India – harbour reservations (worries) about the BRI, while for the other two members (Brazil and South Africa), it is not of such geo-political significance.

[Source: *Global Media and China*, 2018, Vol. 3(2)]

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SOURCE 3B

The extract below is from an article titled 'BRICS and BRI: China Aims for Strategic Alignment' by an Indian researcher, A Singh, and published in the *Observer Research Foundation: Issue Brief 591* in 2022. It highlights how China wanted to strengthen economic connection between the BRI and BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa).

Chinese scholars (researchers) are of the opinion that the 'five connectivities' (policy, infrastructure, trade, finance and people-to-people) is the common way forward for both the BRI and BRICS. They highlight how China has been working towards strengthening the interconnection of economic development strategies of different states along the BRI, particularly the BRICS nations – aligning and integrating BRI and BRICS infrastructure (transportation) projects, ensuring free trade, enabling deep integration of financing mechanisms and pursuing different forms of cooperation.

BRICS countries play a dominant role in organisations in their respective regions. China wants to use the BRICS platform to establish links and influence policies of these key regional organisations, including the African Union in Africa. It wants BRICS, especially the BRICS New Development Bank, to strengthen cooperation with the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank and the World Trade Organisation (WTO). This will enable China, through BRICS, to strengthen its international leadership and play a bigger role in the formulation (creation) of international rules.


In Chinese strategic thinking, the BRI and BRICS are deeply interconnected. BRICS comprise the world's best-performing emerging economies. How does China view each member state within BRICS? It sees itself as the 'leading power centre' of the mechanism, 'the dominant power' or the 'hub or core', with the greatest strength and ability to determine the grouping's future course.

[Source: *Observer Research Foundation*: *Issue Brief 591*, November 2022]

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SOURCE 3C

The cartoon below, drawn by the Chinese cartoonist M Hongliang, appeared in *People's Daily Online* on 22 August 2023. It depicts the USA's claims that China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is a debt trap for countries involved in infrastructure projects.



[Source: *People's Daily Online*, 22 August 2023]

***debt trap:** financial crisis where a country cannot pay off their debt, forcing it to borrow more money to cover their existing obligations, leading to severe financial instability, growing interest and difficulty in escaping from the lender

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SOURCE 3D

The source below, from an article titled 'BRICS+: China's Belt and Road Initiative is Advancing Ethiopia's Infrastructure', by I Surve and S Mdlokovana, appeared in the *Sunday Independent* newspaper, on 26 June 2025. It examines the experiences of Ethiopia (BRICS+ member) with regard to China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).

Ethiopia's 2024 entry into BRICS+ offers new opportunities for funding, technology exchange and strategic partnerships. The BRICS bloc has always championed alternative models of development. The BRICS framework calls for infrastructure-led development, financial independence from traditionally dominant Western lenders, such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and equitable partnerships.

Ethiopia's collaboration (cooperation) with China, particularly within the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), exemplifies (demonstrates) the BRICS vision of fostering physical and digital infrastructure, strengthening South-South cooperation, and promoting industrial growth across the Global South. Despite 'debt trap' criticisms of Chinese infrastructure investments, Ethiopia's experience with the Belt and Road Initiative offers a counter-narrative (different story). The operational Addis Ababa-Djibouti Railway serves as a crucial element in Ethiopia's economic development. Completed in 2016 with Chinese engineering and financing, the 750-kilometre electrified railway that connects landlocked Ethiopia to Djibouti's Port – is the lifeline for over 95% of Ethiopia's exports and imports. This railway has significantly reduced the transport time from three days to less than 12 hours, improving trade efficiency, cutting costs and reshaping the architecture of logistics within the region. Platforms like BRICS and the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) are facilitating this shift, marking a new era of agency (control) for Africa. A future built on collaboration. The Ethiopia-China-BRICS alliance offers a compelling alternative to traditional development models.

[Source: *Sunday Independent*, 26 June 2025]

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Visual sources and other historical evidence were taken from the following:

Fort Worth Star-Telegram, 8 September 1986

Global Media and China, 2018, Vol. 3(2)

Index on Censorship, Issue 7: Volume 17, 1988

Los Angeles Times, 10 January 1988

Mail and Guardian, 28 April 2000

Observer Research Foundation, Issue Brief 591, November 2022

People's Daily Online, 22 August 2023

The SABC *Special Report on Truth and Reconciliation*, Episode 83, Part 1, 1 March 1998

Sunday Independent, 26 June 2025

The Journalist, 26 September 2017

TRC Final Report, Volume 3, Chapter 2, 1998

Villa-Vicencio, C and Verwoerd, W. 2000. *Looking Back, Reaching Forward: Reflections on the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa*. (University of Cape Town Press, Cape Town)

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Visuele bronne en ander historiese bewyse is uit die volgende geneem:

Fort Worth Star-Telegram, 8 September 1986

Global Media and China, 2018, Vol. 3(2)

Index on Censorship, Uitgawe 7: Volume 17, 1988

Los Angeles Times, 10 Januarie 1988

Mail and Guardian, 28 April 2000

Observer Research Foundation, Issue Brief 591, November 2022

People's Daily Online, 22 Augustus 2023

Die SABC *Special Report on Truth and Reconciliation*, Episode 83, Deel 1, 1 Maart 1998

Sunday Independent, 26 Junie 2025

The Journalist, 26 September 2017

WVK Finale Verslag, Volume 3, Hoofstuk 2, 1998

Villa-Vicencio, C en Verwoerd, W. 2000. *Looking Back, Reaching Forward: Reflections on the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa*. (University of Cape Town Press, Kaapstad)

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BRON 3D

Die bron hieronder, uit 'n artikel met die titel 'BRICS+: China's Belt and Road Initiative is Advancing Ethiopia's Infrastructure', deur I Surve and S Mdlokovana, het op 26 Junie 2025 in die *Sunday Independent*-koerant verskyn. Dit ondersoek die ondervinding van Ethiopië (BRICS+-lid) met betrekking tot China se Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).

Ethiopië se 2024-aansluiting by BRICS+ bied nuwe geleenthede vir befondsing, tegnologie-uitruiling en strategiese vennootskappe. Die BRICS-blok het nog altyd alternatiewe ontwikkelingsmodelle voorgestaan. Die BRICS-raamwerk doen 'n oproep vir infrastruktuur-geleide ontwikkeling, finansiële onafhanklikheid van tradisioneel dominante Westerse leners, soos die Wêreldbank en die Internasionale Monetêre Fonds (IMF), en onpartydige vennootskappe.


Ethiopië se samewerking met China, veral met die Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), illustreer (toon) die BRICS-visie van die bevordering van fisiese en digitale infrastruktuur, wat Suid-Suid-samewerking versterk en industriële groei regdeur die Globale Suide vooruithelp. Desondanks 'skuldmoeras'-kritiek oor Chinese infrastruktuurbeleggings, bied Ethiopië se ervaring met die Belt and Road Initiative 'n ander storie. Die operasionele Addis Abeba-Djiboeti-treinspoor dien as 'n deurslaggewende element in Ethiopië se ekonomiese ontwikkeling. Voltooi in 2016, met Chinese ingenieurswese en finansiering, word Ethiopië, wat deur ander lande omring word, deur die geëlektrifiseerde treinspoor van 750 kilometer met Djiboeti se hawe gekonnekteer. Dit is die lewenslyn vir meer as 95% van Ethiopië se uitvoere en invoere. Hierdie treinspoor het die vervoertyd van drie dae aansienlik verminder na 12 uur, wat handelsdoeltreffendheid verbeter, koste sny en die argitektuur van logistiek in die streek hervorm. Platforms soos BRICS en die Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) vergemaklik hierdie verskuiwing en is 'n teken van 'n nuwe tydperk van aktiwiteit (beheer) vir Afrika. 'n Toekoms wat op samewerking gebou is. Die Ethiopië-China-BRICS-bondgenootskap bied 'n oortuigende alternatief vir tradisionele ontwikkelingsmodelle.

[Bron: *Sunday Independent*, 26 Junie 2025]

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BRON 3C

Die spotprent hieronder, geteken deur die Chinese spotprenttekenaar M Hongliang, het op 22 Augustus 2023 in *People's Daily Online* verskyn. Dit beeld die VSA se bewerings uit dat China se Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) 'n skuldmoeras is vir lande wat by infrastruktuurprojekte betrokke is.



[Bron: *People's Daily Online*, 22 Augustus 2023]

***skuldmoeras:** finansiële krisis waar 'n land nie hulle skuld kan afbetaal nie, wat hulle dwing om nog geld te leen om hulle bestaande verpligtinge te dek, wat lei tot ernstige finansiële onstabiliteit, groeiende rente en moeite om van die lener weg te kom (te ontsnap)

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BRON 3B

Die uittreksel hieronder is uit 'n artikel met die titel 'BRICS and BRI: China Aims for Strategic Alignment' deur 'n Indiese navorser, A Singh. Dit het in 2022 in die *Observer Research Foundation: Issue Brief 591* verskyn. Dit sit uiteen hoe China die ekonomiese verbintenis tussen die BRI en BRICS (Brasilië, Rusland, Indië, China en Suid-Afrika) wou versterk.

Chinese geleerdes (navorsers) is van mening dat die 'vyf konnektiwiteite' (beleid, infrastruktuur, handel, finansies en mens-tot-mens) die algemene pad vorentoe vir beide die BRI en BRICS is. Hulle lê klem op hoe China werk aan die versterking van die onderlinge verband van ekonomiese ontwikkelingstrategieë van verskillende lande langs die BRI, veral die BRICS-lande – deur BRI- en BRICS-infrastruktuur(vervoer)-projekte in lyn te bring en te integreer, wat vry handel sal verseker, intensiewe integrasie van finansieringsmeganismes moontlik sal maak en verskillende vorms van samewerking sal nastreef.

BRICS-lande speel 'n dominante rol in organisasies in hulle onderskeie streke. China wil die BRICS-platform gebruik om bande te smee en beleide van hierdie sleutelstreeksorganisasies te beïnvloed, onder meer die Afrika-unie in Afrika. Hulle wil hê BRICS, veral die BRICS New Development Bank, moet samewerking met die Internasionale Monetêre Fonds (IMF), die Wêreldbank en die Wêreldhandelsorganisasie (WHO) versterk. Dit sal China, deur BRICS, in staat stel om sy internasionale leierskap te versterk en om 'n groter rol in die formulering (skep) van internasionale reëls te speel.

Volgens Chinese strategiese denke is die BRI en BRICS onderling sterk verbind. BRICS bestaan uit die wêreld se bes presterende opkomende ekonomieë. Hoe beskou China elke lidland in BRICS? Hulle beskou hulleself as die 'leidende magspunt' van die meganisme, 'die dominante mag' of die 'middelpunt of kern', met die grootste mag en vermoë om die groep se toekomstige koers te bepaal.

[Bron: *Observer Research Foundation*: *Issue Brief 591*, November 2022]

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VRAAG 3: BEVOORDEEL DIE CHINESE BELT AND ROAD INITIATIVE (BRI) BRICS+-LANDE?

BRON 3A

Die uittreksel hieronder, uit 'n navorsingsartikel met die titel 'BRI: Bridging or Breaking BRICS' deur D Thussu, het in die joernaal *Global Media and China*, 2018, Vol. 3(2) verskyn. Dit sit die aard van China se Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) en hulle verband met BRICS uiteen.

China se ambisieuse Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) het die potensiaal om die geo-ekonomiese landskap van Asië, die Midde-Ooste, Afrika en selfs Europa te verander. Dit is in 2013 ontwikkel (geskep), in 2015 deur China se National Development and Reform Committee beskryf en in Mei 2017 formeel bekend gestel. Voltooiing word in die volgende dekade verwag. Die BRI bestaan uit meer as 900 infrastruktuur-projekte – wat wissel van hawens en paaie tot digitale infrastruktuur, teen ongeveer VSA$1,3 triljoen gewaardeer.

Die BRI-projekte gaan deur 'n VSA$40 miljard-Silk Road Infrastructure Fund ondersteun word. Dit gaan ook gesteun word deur die Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank saam met die BRICS-Bank, met die formele naam die New Development Bank (NDB), in Shanghai geleë, wat in 2014 deur die vyf BRICS(Brasilië, Rusland, Indië, China en Suid-Afrika)-nasies gestig is.

In die meeste Chinese amptelike en joernalistieke verslae, word die BRI as 'n 'wen-wen-situasie' vir al die betrokkenes voorspel. Sommige beskou egter hierdie belangrike geopolitieke onderneming (poging) as ontwerp om Chinese politieke en ekonomiese belange in strategies belangrike gebiede in Asië en elders te bevorder, wat 'n alternatief vir die Amerikaans-gedomineerde sekuriteits- en ekonomiese infrastruktuur bied wat die wêreld sedert die Tweede Wêreldoorlog vorm.

Vir baie ontwikkelende lande wat by die BRI-projekte betrokke is, ontsluit dit groot potensiaal vir vinnige toegang tot moderne geriewe en infrastruktuur om uit Chinese vrygewigheid (rykdom) voordeel te trek. Onder die BRICS-nasies is die houding meer kompleks. Twee van China se hoof-BRICS-vennote – Rusland en Indië – koester voorbehoude (bekommernisse) oor die BRI, terwyl dit vir die ander twee lede (Brasilië en Suid-Afrika) nie van soveel geopolitieke betekenis is nie.

[Bron: *Global Media and China*, 2018, Vol. 3(2)]

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BRON 2D

Die bron hieronder is 'n uittreksel uit 'n artikel met die titel 'Lid Not Lifted on Bopape Cover-up', deur P Pigou, 'n voormalige WVK-navorser, wat op 28 April 2000 in die *Mail and Guardian*-koerant verskyn het. Dit stel voor dat die toestaan van amnestie aan 10 voormalige veiligheidspolisiemanne vir die dood van Stanza Bopape kontroversieel was en 'n bedreiging vir die geloofwaardigheid van die amnestieproses.

Die Waarheids-en-Versoeningskommissie (WVK) het tot nog 'n kontroversiële bevinding gekom … toe hulle amnestie aan 10 voormalige veiligheidspolisiemanne vir hulle rol in die moord van Mamelodi-aktivis Stanza Bopape in Junie 1988 toegestaan het.

Die verdwyning van Bopape sal in die geskiedenis bekend staan as een van apartheid-Suid-Afrika se mees ingewikkelde pogings tot toesmeerdery. Ten spyte daarvan dat hy in 1988 verdwyn het, is Bopape se dood slegs bevestig nadat die saak voor die WVK verskyn het. Dit is die enigste saak voor die Kommissie waar 'n volledige reeks polisierange – vanaf konstabel tot die voormalige hoof van die veiligheidspolisie (en Suid-Afrika se eerste polisiekommissaris ná apartheid), Generaal Johannes Velde van der Merwe – om amnestie aansoek gedoen het.

Die WVK het bevind dat die aansoekers aan die amnestiekriteria voldoen het; met volledige bekendmaking van al die relevante feite. Maar nadere ondersoek van die amnestietranskripte en -uitsprake onthul 'n selektiewe gebruik van beskikbare bewyse en geen poging om verder navraag oor 'n wye reeks relevante kwessies te doen nie.

Die aansoekers het 'n goed geoliede weergawe van gebeure aangebied wat noukeurig ineengeskakel het en mekaar se weergawes versterk het. Sommige gedeeltes van die geskrewe aansoeke het identiese skrif en uitdrukkingswyses gebruik, wat die indruk laat dat dit verdag (vals) en selektief met betrekking tot besonderhede is.

[Bron: *Mail and Guardian*-koerant, 28 April 2000]

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BRON 2C

Die bron hieronder is uit die getuienis deur Majoor Adriaan van Niekerk (lid van die Veiligheidstak van die Suid-Afrikaanse Polisie) by die Waarheids-en-Versoeningskommissie-verhoor wat op 23 Februarie 1998 oor die dood van Stanza Bopape gevoer is. Dit werp lig op die ondervraging en daaropvolgende dood van Stanza Bopape in polisieaanhouding aan die hande van die Veiligheidstak-polisiemanne en waarom die WVK aan die betrokkenes amnestie verleen het.

MNR. PRINSLOO (Kommissaris): Mnr. Van Niekerk, sal u die Komitee vertel wat met betrekking tot die ondervraging van Stanza Bopape gebeur het?

MNR. VAN NIEKERK (lid van die Veiligheidtak van die Suid-Afrikaanse Polisie): Mnr. Bopape is op 12 Junie 1988 deur mnr. Mostert en mnr. Engelbrecht by John Vorster-plein ondervra. Hy het geweier om saam te werk en enige betrokkenheid by die ANC of terroriste-aktiwiteite ontken. Ek het persoonlik met hom gepraat en die erns van sy aanhouding volgens artikel 29 verduidelik, maar hy het steeds geweier om te praat. Later daardie dag het ons die situasie bespreek en besluit om hom bang (skrik) te maak om hom te oorreed om saam te werk … Ons het mnr. Bopape aan 'n sterk houtstoel in die gang buite my kantoor vasgebind. Sy hemp is verwyder en sy hande en voete is aan die stoel vasgebind. Sersant Du Preez het met die elektriese skoktoestel gewerk terwyl mnr. Engelbrecht die elektrodes (elektriese drade) op Bopape se lyf geplaas het.

Mnr. Bopape se kop het gedurende die derde ronde vorentoe geval en ek het besef iets was verkeerd. Ons het hom losgemaak en op die vloer geplaas. Sersant Du Preez het mond-tot-mond-asemhaling (bybring) probeer, maar hy het geen tekens van lewe getoon nie. Ons het vir 'n polsslag gevoel, maar hy was reeds dood.

Almal teenwoordig – ek, Majoor Charles Zeelie, Adjudant-offisier Hendrik Mostert, Sersant Johan du Preez en Konstabel Jakobus Engelbrecht – het geglo dat hy dood is. Ek het onmiddellik Generaal Erasmus geskakel en hom ingelig oor wat gebeur het. Voorsitter, dit was nooit ons bedoeling om hom dood te maak nie; die doel was slegs om inligting te verkry. Dit was algemene praktyk in die Veiligheidstak om sulke metodes te gebruik wanneer aangehoudenes geweier het om saam te werk.

… Die WVK het tot die gevolgtrekking gekom … Ons is, in die omstandighede en in die lig van wat hierbo gesê is, tevrede dat hulle alles oor al die relevante feite geopenbaar het.


As gevolg daarvan slaag hulle aansoek om amnestie.

[Bron: *Looking Back, Reaching Forward: Reflections on the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa* deur C Villa-Vicencio en W Verwoerd]

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BRON 2B

Die prent hieronder is uit 'n onderhoud wat op 1 Maart 1998 met Francina Bopape, Stanza Bopape se moeder, in die SABC *Special Report on Truth and Reconciliation,* Episode 83, Deel 1 gevoer is. Dit beklemtoon haar antwoord op die getuienis gelewer deur die Veiligheidstakpolisiemanne tydens die WVK-verhoor wat op 23 Februarie 1998 gehou is.



[Bron: Die SABC *Special Report on Truth and Reconciliation*, Episode 83, Deel 1, 1 Maart 1998]

'Al wat ek hulle vra, is om die waarheid te praat en my Stanza se beendere te gee.'

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VRAAG 2: WAAROM IS DIE TOESTAAN VAN AMNESTIE DEUR DIE WAARHEIDS-EN-VERSOENINGSKOMMISSIE (WVK) AAN DIE VEILIGHEIDSTAKPOLISIEMANNE VIR DIE DOOD VAN STANZA BOPAPE AS KONTROVERSIEEL* BESKOU?

BRON 2A

Hierdie bron is 'n uittreksel uit die *Waarheids-en-Versoeningskommissie (WVK) se Finale Verslag* wat in 1998 voorgelê is. Dit ontbloot 'n hoëvlak-toesmeerdery van Stanza Bopape se dood deur die Veiligheidstak en waarom sy moeder 'n beroep op die WVK vir hulp gedoen het.

Mnr. [Johannes Stanley Maisha] 'Stanza' Bopape, 'n bekende aktivis en hoofsekretaris van die Mamelodi Civic Association, het op 12 Junie 1988, drie dae nadat hy saam met sy woonstelmaat mnr. Bheki Nkosi in hegtenis geneem is, in polisieaanhouding by John Vorster-plein gesterf. 'n Hoëvlak-toesmeerdery, waaronder 'n valse ontsnapping en geheime wegdoen van mnr. Bopape se liggaam is deur die Kommissaris van Polisie, Generaal Johan van der Merwe, goedgekeur om die negatiewe politieke uitwerking (gevolge) van sy dood in polisieaanhouding te vermy.

Tot met die onlangse amnestieaansoeke deur 'n aantal polisiemanne wat by Bopape se dood betrokke was, is daar met 'n openbare storie (leuen) volgehou dat Bopape uit polisieaanhouding 'ontsnap' het terwyl hy van Johannesburg na die Vaal vervoer is. Volgens die voormalige Minister van Wet en Orde, mnr. Adriaan Vlok, het Bopape ontsnap toe die drie polisiemanne saam met wie hy gereis het, uit die motor geklim het om 'n pap band te vervang. Bopape het glo die sleutels om sy boeie oop te sluit, in die hande gekry en gevlug. Die polisie het berig dat hulle op hom geskiet het maar nie daarin kon slaag om hom te vang (arresteer) nie, en het beweer dat hy die land moes verlaat het om by die African National Congress (ANC) aan te sluit.

Mnr. Bopape se moeder, me. Mokgaetji Francina Bopape, wat verskeie kere ineengestort het, het 'n hartstogtelike pleidooi by die Kommissie se (WVK) Pietersburg-verhore gelewer vir inligting oor waar haar seun hom sou bevind. Ná 'n vrugtelose (onsuksesvolle) soektog deur haar man vir [Stanza] Bopape in die ANC-banneling-gemeenskap, was me. Bopape daarvan oortuig dat haar seun in polisieaanhouding dood is. Sy kon dit egter nooit bevestig nie. Sy het aan die Kommissie gesê dat sy wou hê dat 'die polisie wat saam met hom was, hiernatoe moet kom en ons vertel waar sy beendere is'.

[Bron: *WVK Finale Verslag*, Volume 3, Hoofstuk 2, 1998]

***KONTROVERSIEEL:** omstrede/twyfelagtig

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BRON 1D

Die uittreksel hieronder, met die titel 'Black Journalists Under Apartheid', het op 24 Oktober 2007 in 'n aanlyn artikel van Taylor en Francis in *Index on Censorship*, Uitgawe 7: Volume 17, 1988 verskyn. In hierdie bron besin Mojalefa Moseki oor sy persoonlike ervaring as 'n joernalis gedurende die apartheidsregering se media-sensorskapperiode in die 1980's.

'… My aankoms by *The Sowetan* het met die huurprotesaksie in die Vaal Townships en die opstand en die driekamerparlementverkiesings in September 1984 saamgeval. Die kreatiwiteit en taaiheid (weerstand) van verslaggewers by die koerant het na vore gekom en die gewilde dagblad het landswyd 'n moet vir meningsleiers in die swart townships geword. Maar die koerant en verslaggewers het duur betaal; sommige is ernstig beseer, in party gevalle 'per ongeluk'; maatskappymotors en fotografiese toerusting is gekonfiskeer.

Impromptu (Onbeplande) vergaderings is deur die redakteur by *The Sowetan* belê soos wat waarskuwings deur die voormalige Minister van Wet en Orde, mnr. Louis le Grange, ingestroom het teen 'die uitbeelding van die polisie in 'n slegte lig' of 'aanstigting (begin) tot onrus'. Desondanks het verslaggewing lewendig gebly by *The Sowetan* onder adjunkredakteur A Klaaste, artikelredakteur J Thloloe en nuusredakteur T Mazwai, wat lank gelede enige 'vrees' wat hulle vir die regeringswette gehad het, verloor het. As personeellede het hulle die ondergang van *The World* en *The Post* gesien en is almal op een of ander stadium vir beweerde skendings van die veiligheidswette aangehou. Daar is geen manier waarop 'n swart persoon arrestasie in Suid-Afrika kan vermy nie, maak nie saak hoe wetsgehoorsaam hulle is nie.

Klaaste, Thloloe en Mazwai kon nie hulle woede teenoor regeringswaarskuwings teen die koerant en die veiligheidsmagte se aktiwiteite in swart townships verbloem (wegsteek) nie. Maar die woede was gewoonlik van korte duur aangesien dit altyd die weg na die bladsye van *The Sowetan* gevind het, net om dikwels deur subredakteurs gesny te word wat aan die sensorskapwette moes voldoen. Maar die nuusredakteur, en ook die subredakteurs, het hulle verantwoordelikhede verloor toe prokureurs begin bepaal het watter stories in die koerant sou verskyn. Dit was in die middel-1980's die neiging vir alle koerante, behalwe die pro-regerings- Afrikaanse pers.'

[Bron: *Index on Censorship*, Uitgawe 7: Volume 17, 1988]

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BRON 1C

Die artikel hieronder, met die titel 'Threats of Censorship and Closures Bode Ill for South African Anti-apartheid Press', deur A Croft, 'n Amerikaanse joernalis, het op 10 Januarie 1988 in die *Los Angeles Times*-koerant verskyn. Dit verduidelik hoe die Suid-Afrikaanse regering teen die anti-apartheid-media opgetree het rakende verslaggewing oor politieke geweld en apartheidsonderdrukking.

Suid-Afrika het 'n wêreldwye oproer begin (veroorsaak) deur die afdwing van streng beperkings op die media toe daar in Junie 1986, ná maande van swart protesgeweld, 'n nasionale noodtoestand afgekondig is. Die beperkings (beheermaatreëls) het eerstehandse verslaggewing van politieke onrus belet (verban) asook nuus oor betogings, anti-apartheid-boikotte en nie-amptelike township-strukture soos volkshowe en straatkomitees. Hulle is in Augustus 1987 versterk met omvattende nuwe magte wat die Minister van Binnelandse Sake, Stoffel Botha, in staat gestel het om enige koerant wat hy geglo het rewolusie aanwakker (aanvuur), vir tot drie maande toe te maak.

Koerantredakteurs sê dat Botha se beperkings subjektief (eensydig) is en dat dit onmoontlik is om te weet wanneer dit oortree word. Hulle sê dat die huidige reeks (stel) regulasies dit alreeds vir koerante moeilik maak om aan die gang te bly, met baie stories wat op regsadvies gesny of uitgelaat moet word. Botha kan teen 'n koerant optree wat hy glo voortdurend die beeld van verbanne swart nasionalistiese groepe bevorder (aanhelp), die ineenstorting van die openbare orde bevorder of haat vir die veiligheidsmagte aanwakker (aanmoedig).


Koerante, soos *The Sowetan*, beweer hulle sal regeringsoptrede in die hof beveg. Swart koerante is bang dat regeringsoptrede teen hulle een van die paar oorblywende uitlaatkleppe vir die stemlose swart meerderheid sal toedraai en tot meer frustrasie en geweld in die townships sal lei. 'Vir swart mense is koerante soos ons s'n die enigste manier waarop hulle uiting aan van hulle diepgewortelde gevoelens kan gee, en nou gaan dit gestop word,' het [Aggrey] Klaaste gesê.

[Bron: *Los Angeles Times*, 10 Januarie 1988]

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BRON 1B

Die spotprent hieronder, met die titel 'MASSABEGRAFNIS IN SUID-AFRIKA' ('MASS FUNERAL IN SOUTH AFRICA'), geteken deur E Hulme, het op 8 September 1986 in 'n Amerikaanse koerant, *Fort Worth Star-Telegram,* in Texas verskyn. Dit beeld die Minister van Binnelandse Sake, Stoffel Botha, se ekstreme maatreëls ten opsigte van die verbanning en sensuur van die gedrukte media uit, ten einde PW Botha se regering teen kritiek te beskerm.



[Bron: *Fort Worth Star-Telegram*, 8 September 1986]

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VRAAG 1: HOE HET PW BOTHA SE REGERING IN DIE 1980's OP DIE ANTI-APARTHEID-MEDIAVERSLAGGEWING GEREAGEER?

BRON 1A

Die uittreksel hieronder, met die titel 'HISTORY OF RESISTANCE AND THE BLACK PRESS', deur Xaba, is uit *The Journalist*-koerant van 26 September 2017. Dit verduidelik hoe verskillende gemeenskapskoerante in die 1980's 'n stem teen onderdrukking in Suid-Afrika geword het.

Grassroots, 'n gemeenskapskoerant, is uiteindelik in 1980 op die been gebring (gestig) ná 'n uitgerekte dinkskrumproses ('brainstorming') wat in die 1970's onder progressiewe joernaliste in die Writers' Association of South Africa begin is. Die koerant sou tot 1990 bedryf word en was 'n taak van verbintenis aan die stryd van die African National Congress (ANC) en hulle bondgenote. Dit het tot ongeveer 20 000 lesers gegroei. Agt maande ná *Grassroots* gestig is, is hulle eerste organiseerder, Johnny Issel, verban, maar die koerant het bly voortbestaan.

Die koerant het bestaan uit vrywilligers van 60 demokratiese organisasies, soos die Western Cape Civic Association (WCCA), Cape Areas Housing Action Committee (CAHAC), vroue- en jeugorganisasies, die jeug onder die Cape Youth Congress (CAYCO) met meer as 400 bydraende lede en het oorleef op fondse vanaf 'n groep Protestantse kerke in Nederland. Teen 1984 het die gemeenskapsondersteuning van *Grassroots* die stigting van *Saamstaan* (*'United We Stand'*) aangemoedig, 'n gemeenskapsnuusbrief wat in die klein landelike dorpie Swellendam in die Kaapprovinsie gestig is. Hulle het gou hulle basis na Oudtshoorn, 'n groter, hoofsaaklik landelike dorp, ook in die Kaap, verskuif. Van die begin af het hulle voortdurende polisieteistering teëgekom in 'n gebied waar polisiewaaksaamheid (bewustheid), in vergelyking met Kaapstad, sterk was.

Daar was ook 'n ander Wes-Kaapse koerant, *South*, wat suksesvol 'n stem aan die United Democratic Front en ander progressiewe magte in die gebied verskaf het, terwyl hulle dekking vir die plaaslike gemeenskap relevant was. *New Nation*, in die destydse Transvaal, het ook in die 1980's 'n belangrike plek beklee. Die swart pers, wat weerstand gebied het, het gedurende die vele dekades van onderdrukking daartoe bygedra om die mense van Afrika se stemme lewendig te hou.

[Bron: *The Journalist*-koerant, 26 September 2017]

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GESKIEDENIS V2

MEI/JUNIE 2026

ADDENDUM

Hierdie addendum bestaan uit 14 bladsye.